The Petitioner seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification as a member ofthe professions holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2).
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not establish their eligibility for the requested national interest waiver. We dismissed a subsequent appeal. The matter is now before us on combined motions to reopen and reconsider.
The Petitioner bears the burden ofproof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the combined motions.
A motion to reopen must state new facts and be supported by documentary evidence.
with national importance contemplated in Dhanasar. Id. And, in response to the Petitioner's claims in his appeal that the Director's decision emphasized the employment projections and geographical breadth of the endeavor, we concluded that the Director properly analyzed and evaluated the Petitioner's endeavor under the Dhanasar framework, considering the prospective impact of his endeavor to the field rather than its geographical breadth.
And, while we acknowledged the Petitioner's assertions and evidence relating to the importance of the electrical engineering field, we explained that, when determining national importance, we considered the prospective impact of the specific endeavor, rather than the collective importance of the field or occupation.Argued the field's importance, not the endeavor's Accordingly, we concluded that the industry reports and articles emphasized the importance of the field, but did not demonstrate the national importance of the Petitioner's specific endeavor. We also reserved the Petitioner's appellate arguments regarding his eligibility under Dhanasar 's second and third prongs, as considering them would have served no meaningful purpose. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (stating that agencies are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are unnecessary to the ultimate decision); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible).
On motion, the Petitioner submits a brief which is substantially similar to the brief submitted in support of his appeal, along with three new articles discussing the importance of the electrical engineering field and the field's growth potential in the next seven years. Considered collectively, the new articles do not demonstrate the Petitioner's eligibility for a national interest waiver, nor do they evidence new facts that are relevant to the issues raised in our dismissal of the Petitioner's appeal. As stated, the Petitioner previously provided articles addressing the importance of electrical engineering and its impact on various industries, and we explained that while this evidence could support the substantial merit ofhis endeavor, this evidence does not establish the prospective impact of his spec[fic endeavor. On motion, the Petitioner does not explain why these articles directly establish the impact of his endeavor, rather than the collective importance of the field. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not provided any new facts establishing the national importance of the proposed endeavor, and therefore he has not provided a basis for granting a motion to reopen.
On motion to reconsider, the Petitioner asserts that our decision "improperly suppressed the weight of the robust and vast documentary evidence submitted." In support of this, the Petitioner cites USCIS policy relating to the evaluation ofevidence, concluding that this shows the decision is in clear conflict with the evidence in the record and incorrectly applied laws and policies. Notably, however, the Petitioner does not identify what evidence our decision did not correctly evaluate, or how our decision was not consistent with the policy cited, nor does he specifically address the conclusions made in our decision. Instead, the Petitioner generally disagrees with our conclusions and primarily reargues facts and issues we have already considered in our previous decision.
The Petitioner cannot meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider by broadly disagreeing with our conclusions; the motion must demonstrate how we erred as a matter of law or policy. See e.g., Matter ofO-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) ("a motion to reconsider is not a process by which a party may submit, in essence, the same brief presented on appeal and seek reconsideration by generally alleging error in the prior Board decision").
The Petitioner has not established new facts relevant to our decision that would warrant reopening of the proceedings, nor has he shown that we erred as a matter oflaw or policy. Consequently, we have no basis for reopening or reconsideration ofour decision, and the combined motions will be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4).
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed.
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed.