The Petitioner, an aircraft maintenance technician, seeks classification as an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts or business. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b )(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(2). The Petitioner also seeks a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement that is attached to this EB-2 immigrant classification. See section 203(b )(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(2)(B)(i). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may grant this discretionary waiver ofthe required job offer, and thus ofa labor certification, when it is in the national interest to do so.
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not qualify for classification as an individual of exceptional ability. The Director further concluded that the Petitioner had not established that a waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the national interest. The matter is now before us on appeal. 8 C.F.R. § I03.3.
The Petitioner bears the burden ofproof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of Christa 's, Inc. , 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.
Law
To establish eligibility for a national interest waiver, a petitioner must first demonstrate qualification for the underlying EB-2 visa classification, as either an advanced degree professional or an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. Section 203(b )(2) of the Act. For the purpose of determining eligibility under section 203(b )(2)(A) of the Act, "exceptional ability" is defined as "a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulations further provide six criteria, at least three of which must be satisfied, for an individual to establish exceptional ability:
(A) An official academic record showing that the [ noncitizen] has a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning relating to the area of exceptional ability;
(B) Evidence in the form ofletter(s) from current or former employer(s) showing that the [noncitizen] has at least ten years of foll-time experience in the occupation for which he or she is being sought;
(C) A license to practice the profession or certification for a particular profession or occupation;
(D) Evidence that the [noncitizen] has commanded a salary, or other renumeration [sic] for services, which demonstrates exceptional ability;
(E) Evidence of membership in professional associations; or (F) Evidence of recognition for achievements and significant contributions to the industry or field by peers, governmental entities, or professional or business organizations.
Analysis
The Director concluded that the record satisfies at least three of the six exceptional ability criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii). More specifically, the Director found that the record satisfies the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(C). The Director specifically concluded that the record does not satisfy the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(E)-(F), without commenting on the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(D). The Director then conducted a Kazarian final merits determination ofthe record, concluding that it does not establish the Petitioner has a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business.
For the reasons discussed below, we withdraw the Director's conclusion that the record satisfies the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Furthermore, we withdraw the Director's conclusion that the record satisfies at least three ofthe six exceptional ability criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii). The Petitioner does not assert on appeal-and the record does not support the conclusion-that the Petitioner satisfies the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(D)-(F), in addition to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(B). Because a petitioner must first satisfy at least three of the six exceptional ability criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii) and, in this case, the Petitioner has not satisfied the requisite number of criteria, we need not address whether the record establishes the Petitioner has a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business.Exceptional ability not established The criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B) requires "[e]vidence in the form ofletter(s) from current or former employer(s) showing that the [noncitizen] has at least ten years of foll-time experience in the occupation for which he or she is being sought." In this case, as noted above, the occupation the Petitioner seeks for himself as a self-petitioner is an aircraft maintenance technician. Initially, in support of the Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers, the Petitioner submitted four letters from current or former employers; however, only one of the letters specified whether the Petitioner had full-time experience during his employment, as required by the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the record contains a one-page letter, written in English, dated March 2020, from the engineering manager ofl Iaddressed to "FAA Administrator." The letter asserts that the Petitioner has worked as an aircraft maintenance technician for~-----------~ located in Venezuela, "from 01/18/2016 until the present ... p. 4 trainer, or NDT inspector, respectively, were on a full-time basis, as required by the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Furthermore, none of the letters from I Ias translated in the record, describe the duties the Petitioner perform( ed), in order to establish whether his experience is in the occupation for which he seeks as a self-petitioner, as required by the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B).
In response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner submitted a new employment verification letter, written in English, dated October 2022, from the co-founder and director of I IThe letter asserts that the Petitioner, as a co-founder and general manager, has worked forl Ilocated in Venezuela, "on a full-time basis and uninterruptedly ... since the company was established on October 06, 2006, until the present time."Support letters generic or unsupported Beyond the position's title, the letter describes the duties the Petitioner performs, which are consistent with the occupation for which he seeks as a self-petitioner. Therefore, the letter asserts that the Petitioner had approximately 14 years of full-time experience in the position for which he seeks as a self-petitioner as of the November 2020 petition filing date. We note that the Petitioner also asserted in response to the RFE, "In 2017, seeking to expand my work to the United States, I opened my own U.S. [c]ompany, dedicated to being a commercial office of my Venezuelan [ c ]ompany and ~-------~ serving several airlines and FAA repair stations in the United States." Relatedly, the Petitioner submitted articles of incorporation for the U.S. company dated 2017, bearing an address in Florida. The record contains information that is inconsistent with the relevant letters of employment, undermining their veracity. On the Form I-140, the Petitioner provided an address in the United States and he further stated that the date of his last arrival in the United States was in November 2019, prior to the dates of the letters from.__________________________, discussed above. The record does not reconcile how the Petitioner could have accrued full-time experience working for~------------------------' both located in Venezuela, "until the present" and "until the present time," to wit March 2020 and October 2022 respectively, when he had departed Venezuela and entered the United States in 2019. Specifically, the letter letters list duties that require physical presence and they purport that the Petitioner has performed those duties. The letter from ~------------~asserts that the Petitioner "has been performing many maintenance functions which include but are not limited to . . . removal and installation of [numerous aircraft components]," "[s]ervicing and replenishing of hydraulic and oil systems," and other duties that require physical interaction with aircraft. Similarly, the letter from I Iasserts that the Petitioner's duties, which he performed "on a full-time basis and uninterruptedly," include performing "non-destructive tests on aircraft structures, engines, and components," ensuring "that the precision equipment and tools are calibrated at the time of use [and] the maintenance ofall equipment and tools so that they are always serviceable," maintaining "facilities in a clean and orderly condition to prevent accidents and damage by external objects," properly "handl[ing] all parts and pieces under inspection, ensuring their preservation during their stay," and other duties that require physical interaction with aircraft, equipment, and facilities located in Venezuela.
The Petitioner's stated physical presence in the United States casts doubt on the letters that purport he performed duties on a full-time basis for two companies located in Venezuela that require physical interaction with aircraft, equipment, and facilities located therein. Furthermore, we note that the record does not reconcile how the Petitioner could have performed aircraft maintenance tasks for both the p. 5 company he co-founded and another company, simultaneously, on a full-time basis, since January 2016, which casts additional doubt on the veracity of the letters' claims in general. Doubt cast on any aspect of a petitioner's proof may undermine the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988).
Because the Petitioner's physical presence in the United States undermines the veracity of the letters that purport he accrued full-time experience while working in Venezuela at the same time, the letters bear minimal probative value and they are insufficient to establish that he has at least 10 years of fulltime experience in the position he seeks as a self-petitioner, as required by the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). See id.
In light of the foregoing, the record does not establish that the Petitioner has at least 10 years of fulltime experience in the position he seeks as a self-petitioner, as required by the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Therefore, we withdraw the Director's conclusion that the record satisfies the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B) and, because the Petitioner does not assert on appeal-and the record does not support the conclusion-that the record satisfies criteria other than 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A) and (C), we furthermore withdraw the Director's conclusion that the record satisfies at least three of the six exceptional ability criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii). In summation, the Petitioner has not established that the record satisfies at least three ofthe exceptional ability criteria; therefore, we need not determine whether the record shows sustained national or international acclaim and demonstrates that the individual is among the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor. See section 203(b )(2)(A) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2); Kazarian, 596 F.3d 1115. We note, however, that if we were to conduct a final merits determination of the record, it would not support the conclusion that the Petitioner shows sustained national or international acclaim and demonstrates that he is among the small percentage at the very top of the field of endeavor. Furthermore, because the record does not establish that the Petitioner satisfies at least three ofthe exceptional ability criteria, it does not establish that he qualifies for second-preference classification as an individual of exceptional ability. See section 203(b )(2)(A) ofthe Act. We reserve our opinion regarding whether the Petitioner satisfies any of the criteria set forth in Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016). See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"); see also Matter ofL-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n. 7 (BIA 2015) ( declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible).
Conclusion
The record does not establish that the Petitioner qualifies for second-preference classification as an individual of exceptional ability; therefore, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established eligibility for the immigration benefit sought.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.