The Petitioner, an accountant and auditor, seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification as an individual of exceptional ability, as well as a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2).
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding the record did not establish the Petitioner qualifies for EB-2 classification as an alien of exceptional ability or that the Petitioner is eligible for the requested national interest waiver. The matter is now before us on appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3.
The Petitioner bears the burden ofproof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.
To qualify for the underlying EB-2 visa classification, a petitioner must establish they are an advanced degree professional or an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. Section 203(b )(2)(A) of the Act. Exceptional ability means a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the sciences, arts, or business. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). A petitioner must initially submit documentation that satisfies at least three of six categories of evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(F). 1 Meeting at least three criteria, however, does not, in and of itself, establish eligibility for this classification. 2 If a petitioner does so, we will then conduct a final merits determination to decide whether the evidence in its totality shows that they are recognized as having the requisite degree of expertise and will substantially benefit the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States. Section 203(b )(2)(A) of the Act.
We adopt and affirm the Director's decision regarding the specific issue of eligibility for the EB-2 classification. 3 See Matter ofBurbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994); see also Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the practice of adopting and affirming the decision below has been "universally accepted by every other circuit that has squarely confronted the issue"); Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996) (joining eight circuit courts in holding that appellate adjudicators may adopt and affirm the decision below as long as they give "individualized consideration" to the case).
The Petitioner asserts on appeal that the Director "imposed novel substantive and evidentiary requirements beyond those set forth in the regulations." However, the Petitioner does not point to specific examples of how the Director did so. Importantly, she does not offer a detailed analysis explaining the particular ways in which the Director imposed such requirements in denying the petition, supported by pertinent law or regulation.
As noted, the Director determined that the Petitioner did not qualify as an individual of exceptional ability.
4 The Director concluded the Petitioner only satisfied the academic record and membership requirements and so did not establish she met at least three of the six categories of evidence listed at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii).
We agree with the Director that the Petitioner has not established at least ten years of full-time ex enence in her relevant occu ation. On appeal, the Petitioner contends her employment at from August 2014 to June 2018,I I
her statements beyond her own "interactions and observations," which is not sufficient to carry the Petitioner's burden.
We note other inconsistencies in the Petitioner's evidence.Inconsistencies in the record For example, the Petitioner's business plan and expert opinion state the Petitioner possessed eight years of experience as an accountant. This is inconsistent with the information in the Petitioner's Form ETA 750B and resume, which reflect less than five years of experience, as well as the Petitioner's current claim that she has over ten years of expenence. Moreover, the Petitioner's current claim that she began working with I I I Iin April 2007 indicates she began working for this company as an accountant when she was 19 years old, five years prior to her matriculation into university to receive her accounting degree. The Petitioner has not provided an adequate explanation or other evidence to overcome these discrepancies. These unresolved questions and inconsistencies in the record cast doubt on the credibility of the documents submitted. See Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988) (providing that a petitioner must resolve discrepancies in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies). Without the discredited I _letter, the positions which the Petitioner did properly document on her Form ETA 750B and resume comprise less than five years of work experience, rather than the 10 years required under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). Thus, the Petitioner has not met her burden to establish eligibility under this criterion.
We also agree with the Director that the Petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence ofher recognition for achievements and significant contributions to the industry or field by peers, governmental entities, or professional or business organizations as described at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(F). On appeal, the Petitioner argues that her awards and certificates of appreciation serve as recognition ofher significant contributions and exceptional performance, which has broader implications in the industry. She also contends that the expert opinion and recommendation letters constitute peer recognition of her significant contributions to the field.
While the awards and certificates demonstrate the Petitioner's dedication to her work and her employer's appreciation for her services, this evidence does not show that her work has had an impact beyond her employers, clientele, and their projects at a level indicative of achievements and significant contributions to the industry or field.No broader implications shown Similarly, while the expert opinion and support letters discussed the Petitioner's skills, personal attributes, and career successes, they do not explain or show how the Petitioner's contributions were significant to the industry or field. Accordingly, the Petitioner has not established that she fulfills this criterion.
Because the Petitioner has not demonstrated eligibility for the underlying classification, we need not consider whether she merits a discretionary waiver of the job offer requirement "in the national interest" and, therefore, reserve the issue. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (stating that "courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"). The petition will remain denied.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.