immigrant classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, as well as a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(b)(2).
Service Center Operations (SCOPS) denied the petition, concluding the record did not establish that a waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the national interest. The matter is now before us on appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3.
The Petitioner bears the burden ofproof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter oJChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo. Matter of Christa's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537,537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.
In its denial, SCOPS determined the Petitioner did not sufficiently identify his proposed endeavor and, thus, did not demonstrate under the three-prong analytical framework set forth in Matter ofDhanasar, 26 l&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 2016), that his endeavor would have substantial merit and national importance, that he would be well-positioned to advance the endeavor, and that, on balance, waiving the job offer requirement would benefit the United States. 1 On appeal, the Petitioner argues that SCOPS did not properly consider all the evidence or provide a substantive analysis of the record, which he claims violated USCIS policy and the "Accardi doctrine" under United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 2 In particular, he contends that SCOPS did not evaluate or make a determination on the substantial merit of his proposed 1 The Petitioner claimed eligibility for the EB-2 immigrant classification as an advanced degree professional. However, because he is not eligible for, and does not merit a national interest waiver as a matter of discretion, and this determination is dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach and hereby reserve the issue. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) ("As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").
endeavor, and that it erroneously found his endeavor was too vague and lacked sufficient evidence of national importance.Proposed endeavor too vague He also argues that the evidence demonstrated his eligibility under the second and third Dhanasar prongs.
Upon review of the entire record, we adopt and affirm SCOPS' decision. See Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994); see also Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230,234 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the practice of adopting and affirming the decision below "is not only common practice, but universally accepted"). Contrary to the Petitioner's arguments on appeal, SCOPS thoroughly reviewed, discussed, and analyzed the record, but correctly found that the Petitioner's description of his proposed endeavor was too ill-defined and vague to establish his eligibility under the Dhanasar prongs. 3 Beyond generally asserting in his initial filing that his expertise "align[ s] perfectly" with the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program goals and claiming that his goal is "to actively join forces with the transformative mission of the BEAD Program, working to bridge the digital gap and boost connectivity nationwide," the Petitioner provided little detail regarding the specific activities he intends to do in his proposed endeavor.
As SCOPS noted, the Petitioner's response to the request for evidence (RFE) and supplementation of the record with industry articles, support letters, and a professional plan provided little additional inform a ti on to cure this defi ci encY,~.u:....&.J..U..!,.....u.l.l......JL...l..l~UJ..L!...i....J;u.J;;..IJ..l.<.-l....l,Ju..L.J;ui.J.!..l,&JLI.....IJL.ll,l,.I....Ll.l.....U.IJ..I.Jw...1....l..Ll...u..1w..lo.l, his endeavor in his RFE res onse as forSupport letters generic or unsupported